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I. Executive Summary 
 
This State Inspector General (SIG) review was predicated on suspicious indicators at the Advancement 
Foundation (AF) raised in South Carolina State University’s (SCSU) 2012 and 2013 Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (CAFR).  This led to a review of AF’s financial records, which surfaced the issue of an 
inappropriate practice of funding the AF with revenues and rebates from SCSU vendor contracts.  This funding 
mechanism was established in 2005 with a Memorandum of Understanding between the AF and SCSU where 
“certain non-state revenues, which are generated on the campus of SCSU, should be transferred to the AF.”  
This 2005 rationale was flawed.  The “non-state revenue” came directly from contracts between SCSU and its 
vendors for services, and thus any rebate, commission, or revenue is consideration due to SCSU, a state agency, 
and not a related foundation.  This practice of diverting state funds, generally termed rebates, to foundations is 
inappropriate and needs to cease.  Both the Budget and Control Board, Procurement Services Division and the 
SCSU President concur with this analysis.   
 
A review of the period 2010-2013 determined SCSU’s five major vendors, according to SCSU records, 
provided rebates of $11,131,389 during the period.  Reconciliation of records to date revealed $8,831,872 
(79%) and $2,299,517 (21%) were received during this period by SCSU and SCSU foundations, respectively.  
The foundations used the funds for salary supplements, travel, consultants, vendors, flowers, scholarships, 
awards, entertainment, meetings, country club memberships, and a variety of miscellaneous expenses.  
Regardless of the nexus these expenditures have to supporting SCSU, the issue is any consideration from a 
vendor contract with SCSU belongs to SCSU, not a foundation.  The diversion of these funds removes 
transparency in the expenditure of these funds, as well as allows the use to be determined without competing in 
the normal university budgetary framework with other university business needs.  In the very best possible light, 
these expenditures of vendor funds falls into the category of “nice to have” benefits, many of which were 
inconsistent with how the public, appropriators, and state procurement policy envisioned state funds to be spent.     
 
The optic of SCSU executives diverting $2.29 million of vendor contract rebates, which rightfully belongs to 
the university, to foundations, to include discretionary expense accounts for university executives, looks highly 
inappropriate.   Although the practice’s genesis in 2005 likely started with good faith intentions, it was based on 
faulty legal, management, and leadership thinking.  Once the process started, these revenue streams disappeared 
from SCSU’s budgetary process.  It seems the initial AF operated like a traditional foundation with some 
controls such as requiring SCSU executives to make funding requests in writing for the AF Board’s approval.  
However, overtime, the entire vendor contract rebate fund stream was moved to a second foundation, the SCSU 
Foundation, where these funds had no policy, procedures, or oversight on expenditure decisions other than from 
the SCSU executives who controlled and used these discretionary accounts.     
 
The SIG also questioned SCSU vendor contracts with rebates going directly back to SCSU.  Monetary rebates 
are reasonable if directly connected to a profit sharing revenue stream or commissions to incentivize vendors’ 
productivity.  Additionally, capital improvement rebates with a sufficient nexus to services provided, such as 
refurbishing a dining hall in a food service contract, may facilitate passing costs onto students as an appropriate 
user type fee.  However, many rebates are not much more than creative financing to create funds for special 
projects, many having a “nice to have” quality or create an opportunity for parochial projects.  These types of 
rebates undermine transparency, accountability, and managing contract performance in the following areas: 
 
 Creates potential conflicts of interests undermining rigorous contract monitoring by a state agency. As 




forceful with a vendor if I’m getting something on the backend?  I am going to do a whole lot of 
tolerating.’  One contract included a $200,000 unrestricted “partnership gift” on the first day of the 
contract.    
 
 Creates hidden costs to consumers, primarily students.  SCSU students annually pay an extra $343 for 
meals to support the food service vendor’s lump sum monetary contributions back to SCSU and 
foundations.   
 
 Rebate funded special projects can create a “pre-selection” inhibiting the normal comparative scrutiny 
projects should receive in the university, or even legislative, budgetary processes.  The university 
component sponsoring a contract can build in rebate requirements for a parochial project, which has a 
value much less than other university needs.  This parochial project gets funded by creating this 
manufactured revenue stream outside of the normal budget process.  For example, SCSU’s food service 
contract required the vendor to pay $5 million for a new wellness center.  Yet, at the same time, SCSU’s 
current fiscal year budget requested $5.1 million from the state’s general fund for a boiler plant project 
because its current system’s efficiency is less than 30% and “steam piping, traps, and condensate pumps 
are also in a state of disrepair.”  
 
The direction for the future should be to get back to fundamental management in these types of rebate laden 
vendor contracts, with emphasis on transparency and simplicity.  SCSU foundations should be vehicles to 
support SCSU with resources from donations and gifts with a one way fund flow from the foundation to SCSU.  
Any university business activity generating revenue needs to stay within the institution to benefit its operations 
consistent with university priorities and state procurement code.  Stop the practice of unnecessary rebates back 
to the university, which are not much more than creative financing to fund likely parochial projects outside of 
the normal university budgetary process.  The simple analysis is to get rid of the clutter and confusion from 
those unnecessary rebates to focus on the contracts measurable performance, facilitate agency contract 
monitoring to ensure value received, and reduce distractions impacting either.  In short, get back to old fashion 
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This SIG review was predicated on suspicious indicators at the SCSU Advancement Foundation (AF) raised in 
SCSU’s 2012 and 2013 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR).  Each audit report received a 
modified opinion because AF did not provide its financial statement of activities to the external auditor as 
required by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB).  Another 2012 external audit report of 
Federal Awards noted a significant deficiency in internal controls in regards to the lack of financial statements 
for the AF, which were not provided for the period of 2005-2012.  
 
The SIG’s review focused on the following objectives: 
  
 Determine why SCSU and its external auditors could not obtain financial information from the AF, a 
component unit of SCSU, as required by GASB to complete SCSU’s 2012 and 2013 CAFRs;  
 
 Gain access to AF’s financial records and, based on review, assess the risk for fraud, waste, or abuse;  
 
 Review major vendor contract rebates to SCSU and its foundations for period 2010-2013; and 
 
 Identify opportunities to improve.  
 
B. South Carolina State University 
 
SCSU is located in Orangeburg and was founded in 1896 as the state's sole public college for black youth and 
has played a key role in the education of African-Americans in the state and nation.  It consists of 107 buildings 
on 160 acres of land on its main Orangeburg campus.  Today students are majoring in a wide range of programs 
that include agribusiness, accounting, art, English, and drama, as well as fashion merchandising, physics, 
psychology, and political science.  Current enrollment is approximately 3100 students supported with a $146 
million budget.   
 
III. Diversion of SCSU Revenue and Rebates to its Foundations 
 
The SIG’s initial objective, which was to understand the SCSU external auditor’s lack of access to AF financial 
records, started with contact with the AF Chairman and Executive Director.  Both were open and transparent 
with AF’s mission and financial records.  The AF did not see the need to pay for externally audited financial 
statements in the recent past inasmuch as its level of foundation activity had dropped dramatically since 2010.  
The AF was not aware SCSU or its external auditors had issues with access to AF’s records.  A review of SCSU 
records revealed correspondence to AF regarding the need for financial records to meet SCSU CAFR 
requirements, as well as interviews with SCSU’s external auditors indicated the same.  In short, the SIG could 
not reconcile with interviews and records any substantive reason, other than miscommunication, as why the 
external auditor could not obtain AF records to support SCSU’s CAFRs in 2012 and 2013.  However, a 
subsequent review of AF’s financial records to assess the risk for fraud, waste, or abuse did surface the issue of 





The AF was established in 2004, as requested by the Board of Directors, with a goal to “serve as the repository 
for proceeds generated from outsourced enterprises, fund development initiatives, and other special institutional 
campaigns.”  This was followed with a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between AF and SCSU 
where “certain non-state revenues, which are generated on the campus of SCSU, should be transferred to the 
AF.”  The current AF officials affirmed AF’s source of revenue was designed to come from the university; the 
AF did not conduct traditional fundraising activities.   
 
Sometime in 2010, there appeared to be friction between AF and SCSU executives over use of AF funds.  
Afterwards, these vendor contract payments, which can generally be described as contract rebates, were 
exclusively paid to the SCSU Foundation (SCF) into five pre-existing accounts which had also been receiving 
vendor contract rebates.  One was titled, “Institutional Development” and the other four were “discretionary 
accounts” assigned to the individual SCSU positions of President, VP Finance, VP Institutional Advancement, 
and the General Counsel.  The SCF essentially provided a ministerial function to SCSU executives use of these 
funds inasmuch as neither the SCF Director nor the Board had authority over these five accounts despite the 
accounts residing on the books and records of the SCF.     
 
Generally, the AF seemed to focus on several major projects in the early years, such as a Presidential Debate 
and the Low Country Classic, and salary supplements to the SCSU President.  A scan of SCF discretionary 
account expenditures included, travel, consultants, vendors, flowers, scholarships, awards, entertainment, 
meetings, country club memberships, and a variety of miscellaneous expenses.  Regardless of the nexus these 
expenditures have to support SCSU, the issue is any consideration from a vendor contract with SCSU belongs 
to SCSU, a state agency, not a foundation.  The diversion of these funds removes transparency in the 
expenditure of these funds, as well as allows the use to be determined without competing in the normal 
university budgetary framework with other university business needs.  In the very best possible light, SCF 
expenditures of these vendor funds falls into the category of “nice to have” benefits, many of which were 
inconsistent with how the public, appropriators, and state procurement policies envisioned state funds being 
spent.     
 
The SIG reviewed the five major vendors providing rebates to SCSU.  A review of each vendor’s current 
contract along with the specific language requiring a form of rebate back to SCSU were as follows:   
 
 UGL-UNICCO (managed on-site by subsidiary DTZ):  This vendor managed the physical plant of the 
University.  The vendor agreed to pay approximately $200,000 per year ($1 million over a five year 
contract) to the university for special projects of the university’s choice.   
 
 Sodexo:  This vendor provided the food services and managed campus dining halls.  Sodexo had a 
commission based rebate calculated on the volume of sales and type of services provided.  The vendor 
also agreed to pay the following without any performance requirements or contingencies:  $200,000 
unrestricted partnership gift on the first day of the contract; $800,000 in facilities enhancement funds for 
on-going facilities improvements; $175,000 in-kind catering; five complementary meal entries on each 
student meal plan; $710,000 in construction capital investment to enhance certain food locations on 
campus; $5 million in investment as directed by the RFP for supporting the new campus wellness center; 





 Pearce & Pearce:  This vendor provided health plans for students at the university.  Pearce & Pearce had 
a commission based rebate, which involved SCSU collecting premiums and remitting them to the 
vendor and a capitation fee to the university for students seen at the on-campus wellness center. 
 
 Follett:  This vendor operated the campus bookstore.  Follett had a commission rebate contract 
requirement based on the volume of sales.  The vendor also agreed to pay the following without any 
performance requirements or contingencies:  $100,000 to the completion of a new retail-ready Spirit 
Shop in or near the stadium; $66,000 upgrades to retail space; $10,000 annually in general scholarships; 
and $2,000 annually in textbook scholarships. 
 
 Coca-Cola:  Coca-Cola provided beverage and snack vending, as well as exclusive pouring rights in 
dining halls and sporting events.  Coca-Cola paid a commission based on sales, as well as agreed to pay 
six academic scholarships each year, which were annually valued at $43,668.  
 
The first vendor contract, UGL-UNICCO, is fee for service contract where the university pays the vendor for 
services provided.  Any rebate, monetary or capital improvement project, from the vendor to SCSU is 
essentially a return of SCSU’s own funds it paid for services; a classic rebate.  The residual four contracts are 
revenue contracts where SCSU contracts the right to a vendor to provide a service.  The vendor charges 
customers, predominately students; makes a profit; and returns a portion of the profits to SCSU.  These revenue 
rebates can take the form of a recurring profit sharing stream, lump sums, or capital projects.    
 
During the period under review, monetary rebates were 79% to SCSU and 21% to the foundations.  The vendor 
contract rebates back to the foundation were inappropriate, regardless of terminology, because the funds were 
contract consideration back to the SCSU, a state agency, not a foundation.  The Budget and Control Board, 
Procurement Services Division, concurred with this analysis, as did the SCSU President.  Further, there was an 
immediate conflict of interest by SCSU executives permitting such an arrangement of diverting revenue away 
from SCSU, when AF’s MOU specifically allows it “to offer salary supplements to key SCSU employees where 
appropriate.”  The AF’s primary foundation activity provided salary supplements to SCSU Presidents.   
 
IV. Review of SCSU Major Vendors with Contract Rebates for Period 2010-2013 
 
To understand the scope of vendor rebates diverted to foundations, SCSU’s five major vendors’ with contract 
rebates were reviewed for the period of 2010-2013.  According to the AF, SCF, and SCSU records, the below 









Vendor  2010  2011  2012  2013  Total 
Beverage  $43,668 $0 $50,000 ‐  $93,668
Bookstore  $0 $500 $225 $0  $725
Health Insurance  $104,927 $82,309 $168,645 $28,386  $384,267
Food Services*  $590,057 $815,207 $0 $0  $1,405,264
Facilities  $4,994 $205,000 $0 $205,600  $415,594
Totals  $743,646 $1,103,016 $218,870 $233,986  $2,299,518




The reduction in vendor rebates to foundations in 2012 was a result of interim President Cynthia Warrick 
discontinuing the policy of vendor rebates to foundations, which halted most, but not all, such transactions.  A 
variety of documents surfaced identified this policy:   
 
 In a series of June 2012 emails, the interim General Counsel stated, “It is my opinion that such funds 
are state funds and need to go entirely to the university, not to the foundation.  It does not matter who is 
paying the funds.  The revenue is being generated because of university activities, not foundation 
activities, and regardless of who is paying, the funds need to go to the university…it is my strong 
recommendation that no contracts be signed that provide for payments to any other entity than the 
university.”   
 
 The November 15, 2012, SCSU Board minutes confirmed the interim General Counsel’s legal opinion, 
“It was noted that funds from auxiliary services (i.e., food service, facilities management, and book 
store) will no longer appear on this report (Private Giving Report).  These funds should not be co-
mingled.  Auxiliary funds should come directly to the university.”   
 
 In the September 27, 2012, Board minutes, the external auditor’s comments from a recent audit were 
noted as follows, “the University endorsed two checks over to the Foundation account in the amount of 
$750,000, which he recommended should have stayed with the University.  Once checks are signed 
over to a foundation, the University does not have control over them.”  SCSU management provided a 
written response to this issue which concurred and advised the practice had “been amended.”   
 
Despite this 2012 SCSU Board policy on having monetary vendor rebates be directed exclusively to the 
university, the health insurance vendor commissions continued unabated to the SCF totaling $197,030 in 2012-
2013.  Further, in November 2013, a $200,000 vendor rebate check (UGL-UNICCO) payable to SCSU was 
endorsed over to the SCF into a newly established account to support the new President’s inauguration 
activities.  The President, the SCF Director, and the UGL-UNICCO on-site director all recalled the $200,000 
donation was intended for the SCF with no restrictions.  However, the President was not aware of the 2012 
November Board minutes or the 2012 external audit finding on this issue.  The reality was this $200,000 was 
not a donation; it was a contract required payment to SCSU.  According to the contract, the $200,000 UGL-
UNICCO check payable to the SCSU was to the University for special projects of the University’s choice, and 
devoid of the words or concepts of donation or foundation.  Upon learning this, the President recognized if the 
$200,000 was a contract requirement, then the funds should not have been diverted to the foundation.     
 
This is just an example of the contract complexity from rebates creating the false discretion to freely spend 
these annual lump sums on whatever special project regardless of the university’s competing general needs.  It 
took seven years, a federal wiretap investigation, and a series of fiduciary minded analyses to finally stop 
diverting vendor rebates, rightfully belonging to SCSU, to foundations, which then found their way into 
“discretionary” accounts of SCSU executives.  A year later, lessons from the past and the formal 2012 Board 
policy was missed, and SCSU was right back in the same predicament of an inappropriate practice which 
creates the conditions for fraud, waste, and abuse.  Fortunately, the new SCSU President now fully recognized 





V. High Risk Financial Control Environment 
 
During the four years reviewed, SCSU did not have a process to track the five vendors’ rebates.  During the 
majority of these four years, SCF received the vast majority of these rebates to foundations, yet until former 
interim President Warrick stopped this practice in 2012, SCF thought these funds were true donations rather 
than rebates from vendor contracts.  Once SCF received these funds, it had no written policy and procedures on 
the movement of money within accounts controlled by SCSU executives, nor authority levels required to 
approve expenses.  Further, these accounts controlled by SCSU executives resided inside of SCF, yet the SCF 
Director nor the Board had any oversight or authority over these accounts.  Additional examples illustrating this 
high risk financial control environment over vendor rebates included: 
 
 Two vendors inadvertently missed their annual rebate payments totaling over $280,000 without 
SCSU noticing, which these two vendors paid the following year based on their own initiative.   
 
 A vendor did not pay its 2013 rebate of $43,000, and still has not, because it was uncertain as to 
where to send the funds; SCSU was unaware this contract term was violated.   
 
 Despite SCSU Board policy stopping this practice in 2012, the health insurance vendor continued to 
send checks to a foundation totaling $197,030 in 2012-2013 and a $200,000 vendor rebate was 
diverted to SCF in 2013.   
 
 A vendor provided SCSU $100,000 dedicated by contract for a Spirit Shop near the stadium that has 
not been started by the university.  A second vendor provided over $2 million dedicated by contract 
for a wellness center that appears to not have been restricted and diverted to the university’s general 
operations. 
 
 Checks payable to SCSU were endorsed into accounts (foundations) not belonging to SCSU, which 
occurred even after the SCSU external auditors identified this issue in the Fall 2012 and SCSU 
management concurred and amended the practice.   
 
 Some vendor rebates were split into separate checks sent directly to foundations and the university, 
without anyone at SCSU fusing this data together to appropriately monitor vendor compliance with 
contract requirements.  In short, no single person at SCSU “owned” the duty to monitor vendor 
compliance with vendor rebate contract requirements.   
 
In summary, SCSU had inadequate policy, procedures, and controls to manage vendor contract rebates.  The 
practice of vendor rebates to foundations was not only inappropriate, it was poorly controlled.  Although the 
SIG’s review focused on the AF and SCF, the SIG suspects this inappropriate contract rebate practice may be 
taking place in other university foundations.  For example, in June 2012, the interim General Counsel 
determined athletic game contract revenue was going to both the university and to the athletic foundation.  The 
interim General Counsel commented, “I know what has been done in the past, but my job is to make sure that 






VI. Inappropriate Nature of Aspects of Vendor Rebates Direct to SCSU 
 
Without question, vendor rebates from SCSU contracts diverted to foundations were inappropriate; this practice 
must cease.  The SIG also challenges the general concept of vendor rebates from SCSU contracts back to the 
university, with two exceptions.  First, contract commission revenue streams and profit sharing to incentivize a 
vendor to be more productive are quite appropriate.  Second, a contract requiring vendor capital expenditure, 
such as refurbishing a SCSU dining hall in a food service contract, may have a sufficient nexus to be part of a 
reasonable negotiation which may also facilitate passing costs onto students as an appropriate user type fee.  
However, the farther capital projects stray from connectivity to services provided, the less appropriate the 
capital project rebate becomes. 
 
Outside of these two exceptions, the SIG views vendor rebates as undermining transparency, accountability, and 
effective management of contract performance based on the following:   
 
 Creates the potential for conflicts of interests undermining rigorous contract monitoring by a state 
agency.  As one experienced Board member commented on these rebate contract requirements, ‘Why 
would I be forceful with a vendor if I’m getting something on the backend?  I am going to do a whole lot 
of tolerating.’  As an example, one vendor contract included a $200,000 unrestricted “partnership gift” 
on the first day of the contract.    
 
 Creates hidden costs to consumers, primarily students.  SCSU students annually pay an extra $343 in 
meal costs to support the food service vendor’s lump sum monetary contributions back to SCSU and 
foundations.   
 
 Rebate funded special projects can create a “pre-selection” inhibiting the normal comparative scrutiny 
projects should receive in the university, or even legislative, budgetary processes.  The university 
component sponsoring a contract can build in rebate requirements for a parochial project, which has a 
value much less than other university needs.  This parochial project gets funded by creating this 
manufactured revenue stream outside of the normal budget process.  For example, SCSU’s food service 
contract requires the vendor to pay $5 million for a new wellness center.  Yet, at the same time, SCSU’s 
current fiscal year budget requested $5.1 million from the state’s general fund for a boiler plant project 
because its current system’s efficiency is less than 30% and “steam piping, traps, and condensate pumps 
are also in a state of disrepair.”  
 
 Creates needless complexity increasing the administrative costs and risks to ensure contract 
performance.  The aforementioned report section titled, “High Risk Financial Control Environment,” 
illustrates the administrative burden and the risk of significant errors in monitoring these complex 
contracts.   
 
According to the Budget and Control Board, Procurement Services Division, contributions or incentive 
packages in contracts have a long history in South Carolina.  This practice began in order to stop under-the-
table incentives between agencies and prospective vendors.  The argument is that now, all vendors can bid 
openly on both the services/products and enhancements/rebates.  Those terms can also have a standardized point 
range as a part of the bid award.  The state office sees this as increased transparency and allowing equal access 




open exchange of consideration that has no nexus to contract performance.  These rebates actually can create a 
perception of a gift, favor, or discretionary act, as illustrated with the SCSU example above, all of which can 
bestow a level of relationship leverage to the vendor, when in fact the agency is just receiving money the 
contract provides.  This complexity actually creates air cover and opportunity for anyone with corrupt intent.  A 
better course would be to draw an absolute clear line to prohibit these rebates that decreases complexity and 
temptation, while promoting, both in reality and perception, a robust arms-length, performance based business 
relationship.  What image goes through most people’s minds, particularly taxpayers, when a contract term 
states, “a $200,000 unrestricted partnership gift on the first day of the contract?” 
 
To further illustrate this point, SCSU’s food service contract went into effect in August 2011, which required a 
$5 million investment supporting a new campus wellness center.  In that same month, according to a pending 
November 2013 federal indictment (Count 1, overt act 54), two SCSU officials (one under indictment; one 
convicted) “used a cellular telephone” talked about getting a specific person work at SCSU by having this 
person develop a wellness center at SCSU.  Later in the same indictment (Count 1, overt act 94), an SCSU 
official and associate (both under indictment) viewed an Atlanta Falcons Football Game in a $5000 suite; the 
cost was split between an SCSU vendor and a SCSU foundation.  The federal indictment identified six overt 
acts at SCSU.  Of these six overt acts, two involved foundations and five involved SCSU contracts.  Three 
SCSU officials have pleaded guilty and one is under indictment with trial set for the Summer 2014.  These 
examples and common sense dictate less rebates moves a contract to a greater arms-length transparent 
transaction, while more unnecessary, complex, and lump sum rebates creates unfavorable conditions and 
opportunity where other interests than agency and taxpayers’ best interests can seep into the decision making.        
 
During the review, anecdotal data from witnesses with statewide contracting experience in university settings, 
indicated vendor contract rebates was a common practice.  One witness with broad experience said universities 
seem to be driving this practice rather than vendors.   
 
The simple analysis is to get rid of those unnecessary rebates to focus on a contract’s measurable performance, 
simplify agency contract monitoring to ensure value received, and reduce distractions impacting either.  For fee 
for service contracts, there should be a presumption of no rebates.  For revenue contracts, the revenue should 
optimally come back to the university’s general or unrestricted funds in a systematic recurring manner, and any 
form of rebate, often lump sums or capital expenditures, should be viewed skeptically to avoid parochially 
moving contract funds away from the university’s general needs.  The core issue is to maximize contract 
revenues to the SCSU general or unrestricted funds so all projects compete with all other university needs, 
rather than be pigeonholed by a SCSU component for a potential parochial special project.  Reducing 
complexity eases administrative burden, reduces costs, stops revenue bleeds to special funded projects, and 
allows more rigorous contract management, which are all in the direction to save money for the university.   
 
VII. Way Forward—Transparency Prevents Problems 
 
The optic of SCSU executives diverting $2.29 million of vendor contract rebates, which rightfully belong to the 
university, to foundations, to include discretionary expense accounts for university executives, looks highly 
inappropriate.  In the best possible light, the practice’s genesis in 2005 started with good faith intentions but 
with just faulty legal, management, and leadership thinking.  Once the process started, these revenue streams 
disappeared from SCSU’s budgetary process.  It seems the initial AF operated like a traditional foundation with 
some controls such as requiring SCSU executives to make funding requests in writing for the AF Board’s 




no policy, procedures, or oversight on funding decisions other than from the SCSU executives who used these 
discretionary accounts.  This resulted in many expenditures inconsistent with state procurement and taxpayer 
standards, as well as erosion of the university’s trust with stakeholders.     
 
The direction for the future should return to fundamental management in these types of rebate laden vendor 
contracts, with emphasis on transparency and simplicity.  SCSU foundations should be vehicles to support 
SCSU with resources from donations and gifts with one way fund flow from foundation to SCSU.  Any 
university business activity generating revenue needs to stay within the institution to benefit its operations 
consistent with university priorities and state procurement code.  Just get back to old fashion management of 
driving a hard bargain without convoluting rebates, making sure you get what you paid for with contract 
monitoring, and any revenues generated go to an agency’s general or unrestricted accounts to be used in the best 
interests of the agency.   
 
VIII. Findings & Recommendations 
 
Finding #1:  SCSU inappropriately diverted vendor monetary rebates from university contracts to its 
foundations.   
 
Recommendation #1a:  SCSU should establish a policy to require all monetary vendor rebates from 
existing university contracts be directed towards the university and not to foundations.   
 
Recommendation #1b:  SCSU foundations, to include, but not limited to, the Advancement Foundation 
and the SCSU Foundation should return all existing cash, investments, or assets that can be logically 
traced to vendor monetary rebates.     
 
Recommendation #1c:  The Budget and Control Board, through its Procurement Services Division, 
should provide a reminder, similar to a “lessons learned,” to all state agencies, particularly higher 
education state agencies, that all vendor monetary rebates from existing agency contracts be directed 
towards the agency and not to a third party, such as a foundations, unless expressly authorized by law.   
 
Recommendation #1d:  The South Carolina legislature should consider legislation or proviso to require 
all state agencies examine all existing contracts with vendor revenue streams or rebates to ensure these 
funds are directed to the agency and not a foundation or other third party unless expressly authorized by 
law.         
 
Finding #2:  SCSU vendor contracts with rebates, other than of those directly connected to commissions to 
incentivize vendors’ productivity, operational revenue generating, or capital expenditures with a nexus to the 
contract, undermines the transparency, accountability, and effective management of contract performance.  This 
includes, but not limited to, creating potential conflicts of interests undermining rigorous contract monitoring; 
creating hidden costs to consumers, primarily students; and rebate funded special projects potentially creating a 
“pre-selection” inhibiting the normal comparative scrutiny projects receive in the university, or even legislative, 
budgetary processes. 
 
Recommendation #2a:  SCSU should establish a policy for new vendor contracts to require the 
University’ President to personally approve any rebate with the exceptions of those directly connected to 
12 
commissions to incentivize vendors’ productivity, operational revenue generating, or capital 
expenditures with a nexus to the contract. 
Recommendation #2b:  The South Carolina legislature should consider providing a requirement, 
through statute or proviso, for agencies to specifically disclose revenue streams, rebates, and capital 
projects from vendor contracts in the budget process to add visibility of the receipt and use of these 
funds to facilitate analysis of these same agencies’ general fund budget requests.   
Finding #3:  There exists a weak financial control environment, both in the SCSU Foundation and SCSU, in 
managing vendor contracts with rebates. 
Recommendation #3a:  SCSU Foundation, as well as all foundations associated with SCSU, should 
solely support SCSU through fundraising, gifts, and revenue developed independent of the university.  
Recommendation #3b:  SCSU Board of Directors and Executive Management should extricate the 
university from business ventures or complex transactions with foundations that could create real or 
perceived conflicts of interest or financial liability impacting their fiduciary duty and loyalty to the 
university.      
Recommendation #3c:  SCSU foundations should re-examine the adequacy of their respective policies 
and procedures to ensure adequate control over its assets and expenditures and prevent SCSU executives 
having unilateral access to assets without foundation approval.     
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE:  SCSU was provided a draft and had no suggested changes or comments.  The 
Procurement Services Division, Budget and Control Board, provided written comments which can be found 
at the following link:  http://oig.sc.gov/Documents/PSD_BCB_Response.pdf. 
